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Abstract
We call attention to different formulations of how physical laws relate to what is 
physically possible in the philosophical literature, and argue that it may be the case 
that determinism fails under one formulation but reigns under the other. Whether 
this is so depends on our view on the nature of laws, and may also depend on the 
inter-theoretical relationships among our best physical theories, or so shall we argue.
Keywords Physical possibility · Determinism · Laws of nature · Best systems 
account of laws
1 Introduction
Determinism is a metaphysical doctrine stating that under certain conditions there 
is only one way how certain events or facts may be. Adopting the possible worlds 
approach for understanding modal statements, much of the philosophical literature 
focuses on the question whether our best physical theories are deterministic, that 
is whether the worlds that are physically possible according to these theories are 
deterministic: 
(D)  Let W be the set of physically possible worlds according to a physical theory 
T. A world w ∈ W is deterministic according to T just in case for any v ∈ W , 
if the state of w and v agrees at any time, then w and v agree at all times. The 
theory T is deterministic just in case all w ∈ W are deterministic according to 
T.
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 Determinism of a theory is thus determined by its physically possible worlds: 
loosely speaking, the narrower their range, the better determinism’s chances are.
To get a better grip on definition (D)—which is commonly accepted in the phi-
losophy of science literature (see i.e. [12, 31])—we should clarify the concepts of 
physically possible worlds, states, and physical laws of a physical theory. According 
to the received view of physical possibility the set of physically possible worlds of a 
theory is determined by the physical laws of the theory. The way how ([9], p. 412; 
[12], p. 13; [28], p. 18) cash out how this determination by physical laws happens is 
the following: 
(a)  A possible world is physically possible if and only if it satisfies the physical 
laws of the actual world,
 or, resorting to (a)’s theory-relativized version: 
(A)  A possible world is physically possible according to a theory T if and only if it 
satisfies the physical laws of T.
 If we assume that L is a physical law of T if and only if L is a physical law of 
the actual world, then the theory-relativized notion (A) is equivalent with its actual 
world-based (a) counterpart. Authors frequently introduce the notion of physical 
possibility through its actual world-based version, but in practice they invariably 
rely on the theory-relativized version, given the focus of the foundations of physics 
literature on implications of our current physical theories, our best attempts at get-
ting an understanding of our actual world.
To fill in the remaining blanks we need to make further representational choices. 
For the sake of simplifying discussion let us 
(1)  settle with a precise definition of a solution of a differential equation that is a 
function of a time parameter, and agree that the so-defined solutions, and the 
so-defined solutions only, satisfy the differential equation,
(2)  assume that the physical laws of T are mathematically represented by a differ-
ential equation E,
(3)  assume that a physical state is mathematically represented by an (initial) value 
of a solution of E taken at some time, and
(4)  assume that different solutions of E represent different possible worlds.
Given (1)–(4), (A) and (D) the theory T is deterministic if and only if 
(5)  all initial value problems of E have at most one solution.
Determinism of a theory is known to be sensitive to assumptions (1)–(4) due 
to leeways in our choices of mathematical representation; an extensive discus-
sion can be found in Earman [14] and in Gyenis [21] (see also [18] for a general, 
abstract approach to differential equations). Many physicists would be surprised 
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to learn that, despite an effort to settle with representational choices for (1)–(4) 
that give best running chance for determinism, (5) typically fails for many if 
not for most of our best physical theories. As a consequence determinism fails 
according to many of our best physical theories, which is a common wisdom in 
the foundations of physics literature.
Can this conclusion fail to follow if we accept the received view of physical 
possibility, the commonly accepted determinism definition (D), and a represen-
tational choice akin to (1)–(4) that entails the failure of (5)? In this paper we 
point out that a different extant formulation of the received view of physical pos-
sibility may lead us to a different conclusion. There is a split in philosophers’ 
understanding of how the set of physically possible worlds is determined by the 
physical laws. When they present the view they take to be standard, philosophers 
usually state one of two formulations, arguably without being conscious that they 
are different. The first is formulation (a) and resp. (A) we saw above. The sec-
ond formulation, as professed by ([34], p. 6; [6], p. 174; [42], p. 62) and many 
other physicists and philosophers (see also [13, 35] for a similar distinction), is 
the following: 
(b)  A possible world is physically possible if and only if it has the same physical 
laws as does the actual world.
(B)  A possible world is physically possible according to a theory T if and only if it 
has the same physical laws as does T.
Although in both (A) and (B) formulations it is the physical laws that deter-
mine the set of physically possible worlds, we point out that this set of worlds 
may not be the same for the two formulations: whether this is so depends on our 
conception of physical laws. If there is indeed a difference between the set of 
physically possible worlds of (A) and (B), then it may also be the case that while 
most of our physical theories are not deterministic under (1)–(4) and (A), they are 
deterministic under the same (1)–(4) and (B). We point out that some relatively 
standard conceptions of laws may entail this situation, and as a consequence we 
need to be more conscious about our choices regarding the notion of physical 
possibility and of laws.
To make it clear, this paper does not intend to defend or develop new philo-
sophical concepts for determinism, physical possibility, laws of nature, alterna-
tive mathematical representations for states and laws, and neither does it aim to 
focus on determinism in classical mechanics despite illustrating the ideas through 
an example from that physical theory. On the contrary, all employed concepts 
are standard and explicitly adopted by the current philosophical literature (with 
the exception of the BATS account of laws about which we argue that it is also 
implicitly embraced by Humeans). This paper is raising consciousness that cer-
tain combination of otherwise standards concepts of physical possibility and laws 
of nature can allow us to challenge (given certain technical assumptions) the 
claim, commonly accepted as a conclusion in the philosophical literature, that our 
best physical theories are not deterministic.
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2  Accounts of Laws of Nature
There is a difference between the question ‘what are physical laws’ and the ques-
tion ‘what are the physical laws.’ The latter may be answered by providing a list 
of laws that are supposedly represented by differential equations featured in our 
most revered physical theories; the former question asks about the criterion that 
differentiates laws that make their way to the list from other true propositions that 
are non-laws.
There is not only a plethora of accounts of laws of nature but also many ways 
to group and label them alongside commonly shared characteristics. Here we fol-
low Cohen and Callender [10] in distinguishing three varieties.
The No-Laws camp believes that there are no laws of nature: in idealized mod-
els we may find causes, symmetries, or some general principles but they are not 
worthy to be elevated to the status of laws. These accounts are frequently driven 
by a sort of pessimistic meta-induction: ([40], p. 130, pp. 180, 181) draws moti-
vation from the perceived failure of major approaches such as that of Lewis and 
Armstrong while ([20], pp. 86–91) cites cases from the history of science in 
which generalizations once thought to be laws were proven to be false. Mumford 
[30], Cartwright [8], and some projectivist accounts such as that of Ward [41] 
have also been lumped under the No-Laws heading. If one maintains that there 
are no laws, then one can not appeal to the laws to determine physical possibili-
ties, and hence needs to reject the received view of physical possibility.
The Governing camp, advocates of which include Armstrong [1–4], Dret-
ske [11], Maudlin [28], Shoemaker [37], Swoyer [38], and Tooley [39], insists 
that genuine laws of nature exist and stipulate that these laws govern events and 
happenings in the world. In the eloquent words of Cohen and Callender, “just 
as librarians enforce the rules of book borrowing and policemen enforce traffic 
rules, so some Governing theorists think that necessitarian relations, primitive 
accessibility relations, or primitive universals enforce certain behaviors upon the 
events of the world. Other advocates of Governing are silent on how the laws 
manage these feats, but insist that they do and treat laws with the requisite gov-
erning powers as primitive” (ibid. p. 2). Not only do some Governing advocates 
treat laws as primitive, but they also ascribe the power to the laws to generate, 
evolve, bring about, or propagate physical states. Thus ([28], p. 15) writes:
My own proposal is simple: laws of nature ought to be accepted as ontologi-
cally primitive. We may use metaphors to fire the imagination: among the 
regularities of temporal evolution, some, such as perhaps that described by 
Schrödinger’s equation, govern or determine or generate the evolution.
The Non-Governing camp also insists that genuine laws of nature exists but deny 
that these laws govern. Instead of governing the laws merely describe certain 
aspects of patterns that obtain in the mosaic of events. One of the most preva-
lent Non-Governing views is the Best System account associated with Callender 
[5], Cohen and Callender [10], Earman [12], Lewis [22–25], Mill [29], Loewer 
[26] and Ramsey [36]. According to the Best System account the distinguishing 
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feature of laws is that they are highly informative about the world in a simple 
way: they are propositions of a deductive system which best balances informa-
tiveness and simplicity.
One of the main dividing lines between the Governing and the Non-Governing 
camps is in how they relate to Humean supervenience, “the doctrine that all there is 
in the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, [...] an arrangement 
of qualities. And that is all. There is no difference without difference in the arrange-
ment of qualities. All else supervenes on that.” (Lewis; [24], pp. ix, x). Humean 
supervenience tries to capture the empiricist constraint that laws should supervene 
on the mosaic of non-nomic facts; what counts as ‘non-nomic’ and ‘fact’ is a mat-
ter of debate. There exist several, more sophisticated statements of Humean super-
venience; for an analysis see Earman and Roberts [16, 17]. In general advocates of a 
Governing view deny Humean supervenience about laws of nature, while advocates 
of Non-Governing views, in particular of the Best System view, embrace it.
All three accounts of laws have been severely criticized. Without laws it is very 
difficult to explain practice of the physical sciences and to explain why certain reg-
ularities and patterns among events hold. While Governing views may be able to 
explain, in terms of their favored necessitarian relations, primitive accessibility rela-
tions, or primitive universals, why certain patterns among the events hold they seem 
to merely push the explanatory issue one step back as they are unable to explain 
why the employed particular relations or universals hold. If they provide no explana-
tory advantage, then postulating laws as entities existing in addition to the mosaic 
of facts goes against metaphysical parsimony. The Best System view is in danger 
to render laws subject dependent as notions of simplicity, informativeness, and best 
balance seem to be very difficult to articulate from an objective point of view. For 
an overview of the main advantages and the main lines of criticism mounted against 
these views see i.e., Carroll [7].
In their above-mentioned article Callender and Cohen proposed to relativize the 
Best System account to specific choices of basic kinds or basic predicates. They 
claim that even though there is indeed no objective point of view from which sim-
plicity, informativeness and best balance could be judged, such vantage point is also 
not necessary to find a satisfactory account of laws. They hold a true generalization 
to be a law relative to a choice of basic kinds or predicates if the generalization 
appears in all immanently Best Systems relative to these basic kinds or predicates. 
They take relativity to be an advantage of their account; with its help they claim to 
be able to solve many problems plaguing the traditional Best System view, such as 
the problem of immanent comparisons. In addition they see Relativized Best System 
or RBS to be capable of giving an account for laws in the special sciences.
This last point will be of interest for us later. In order to accommodate the special 
sciences, the authors concede that RBS needs to allow for exceptions because claims 
of special sciences “will be in principle defeatable by lower-level physical limita-
tions” (ibid. p. 25). One proposal they make to amend this difficulty is to “relax the 
requirement that the MRL [Mill–Ramsey–Lewis, referred here as Best System] laws 
be true and replace it with some other requirement, like pragmatic reliability (as 
determined by the science of interest)” (ibid. fn 24). Apparently the authors believe 
that (exact) truth is not a sine qua non of laws: it is consistent with an understanding 
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of laws as simple and informative systematizations that under certain circumstances 
laws may happen to be false. Presumably this can only happen if the price of false-
hood is paid back in improvement of the overall balance of simplicity and infor-
mativeness. As generalizations that are not even approximately true can not be 
informative, this suggestion amounts to relaxing the condition that laws are true gen-
eralizations to the condition that laws are approximately true generalizations. For 
later purposes we can thus label this the Best Approximately True Systems (BATS) 
account: 
(BTS)  Laws are true propositions of the deductive systems which best balance 
simplicity and informativeness.
(BATS)  Laws are approximately true propositions of the deductive systems which 
best balance simplicity and informativeness and approximation to truth.
Difference between BTS and BATS may be highlighted by an example. Which 
deductive system carries more the merit of lawhood: one which implies the exact 
value of the electromagnetic field in one spacetime point but is completely silent 
about its values everywhere else, or another which implies the values of the electro-
magnetic field everywhere, but only up to an approximation which lies beyond our 
measurement capabilities to detect? BTS would force us to choose the first option 
while BATS would also allow for the second.
We do not aim to argue here for the validity of BATS. We merely submit that 
BATS is an account which should be amenable to defenders of a Best System 
account of laws. As we have already pointed out the Relativized Best System 
account implicitly already embraces BATS. Any other account that allows the spe-
cial sciences to have laws is also likely to implicitly embrace BATS: if the same 
mosaic of events may be subject to laws of theories located on different levels of the 
proverbial layer cake, then truth with approximation should be sufficient for laws, 
since theories on a higher level typically operate with more coarse-grained descrip-
tions than theories on the lower level that have more nuanced descriptive tools.
3  Received Views and Possible Worlds
The set of physically possible worlds under formulation (B) may be narrower than 
under formulation (A). Formulation (B) not only requires a physically possible 
world to satisfy the physical laws L, but also that L are the physical laws of the 
physically possible worlds themselves. This latter condition does not follow auto-
matically from the former: depending on our conception of physical laws it may be 
the case that a possible world w satisfies L, but L is not a physical law in w.
Indeed for a Best System account we should expect such cases to occur. Let our 
theory T be classical electrodynamics. Since the possible world which is empty 
also satisfies Maxwell’s equations, it is physically possible according to formula-
tion (A). But this empty world may not be physically possible according to formu-
lation (B) and a Best System account, since the deductive system best balancing 
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informativeness and simplicity in the empty world may simply contain the proposi-
tion that ‘the world is empty.’ Maxwell’s equations are true in this empty world, but 
they are not laws of it, since they are not simple enough given the alternatives.
The difference can also be easily seen without invoking a Best System account, as 
long as we maintain Humean supervenience about laws. Most of our current physi-
cal theories allow for an “empty” world to satisfy its physical laws. Hence the empty 
world is physically possible according to several different theories under formula-
tion (A). However, this empty world could possess exactly the same laws of at most 
one of these theories, and hence it can not be physically possible under formulation 
(B) for the other theories. Hence as long as our account of laws of nature is capable 
to recover at least some of our current physical theories (without which it’d arguably 
be without much merit as an account of laws), the two formulations will produce 
different physically possible worlds.
4  Must Determinism Fail? A Research Project
Suppose now that assumptions (1)–(4) hold for a theory T with differential equation 
E but (5) does not. Then it follows from formulation (A) of the received view and 
from definition (D) that T is not deterministic. Is there an account of laws of nature 
which, conjoined with formulation (B) of the received view, renders T deterministic 
according to (D)?
The set of physically possible worlds of formulation (A) is the union of the set of 
solutions of E that are deterministic and the set of solutions of E that are not deter-
ministic. In order to achieve determinism the set of physically possible worlds of 
formulation (B) must be narrower: it may contain all deterministic solutions, but it 
can not contain more than one solution from any of the ‘non-determinism bouquets’ 
(from any of the sets of solutions of E that agree in some of their states). We are thus 
seeking an account of law of nature which crowns E as the representation of the law 
of possible worlds that are represented by deterministic solutions, but which crowns 
E as the representation of the law of at most one of the possible worlds that are rep-
resented by solutions in a non-determinism bouquet.
What properties may tell apart deterministic and not deterministic solutions? The 
following difference is clear: for deterministic solutions E is maximally informative 
in the sense that being supplemented by a state it furnishes all non-nomic facts. E 
however is not maximally informative in this sense for a not deterministic solution, 
and in fact may fare pretty badly in narrowing the set of non-nomic facts that may 
obtain. This difference in informativeness of E for deterministic and not determinis-
tic solutions signals that some variant of the Best Systems account of laws may do 
the job for us.
An account of laws that exploits the difference in informativeness of E between 
deterministic and not deterministic solutions may help ensuring determinism of the 
theory. Suppose that s is a not deterministic solution of E: albeit s satisfies E, E is 
not necessarily a law of the world represented by s, because there may be an alter-
native proposition (not necessarily a differential equation) L′ that our account of 
laws crowns as the law of the world represented by s on the grounds that L′ is more 
 Foundations of Physics
1 3
informative of s than E. If such an alternative L′ exists, then s is not physically pos-
sible according to the (B) formulation of physical possibility, since the (B) formula-
tion requires a physically possible world to have the same laws as the theory, but E 
is not a law of s. To generalize, if for any not deterministic solution there existed 
an alternative proposition that is crowned as the law of said not deterministic solu-
tion, then determinism of the theory would be restored. If the account of laws is 
Best Systems type then the alternative proposition L′ would need to provide a better 
balance of informativeness and simplicity than does the law represented by E. To 
sum up, if for any not deterministic solution such an alternative L′ existed, then the 
Best Systems view, together with assumptions (D), (1)–(4), ¬(5) and formulation 
(B) would entail that the theory T is deterministic, despite T not being deterministic 
under assumptions (D), (1)–(4), ¬(5) and formulation (A).
This problem defines a research project whose success would entail the non-
failure of determinism. On the mathematical-physical side of the project we would 
inquire whether for every not deterministic solution of a physically relevant differ-
ential equation we could find another simple proposition that is more informative 
about this solution than the original differential equation. On the philosophical side 
of the project we would seek to independently motivate the notions of simplicity and 
informativeness that characterize said proposition, and on the basis of these notions 
we would seek the variant of the Best Systems view which crowns this and such 
propositions as laws of the corresponding not deterministic solutions. We now take a 
look at the plausibility of success of this research project to save determinism.
4.1  Could Our Research Project Plausibly Succeed?
In abstracto the prospects of our research project of saving determinism seem bleak. 
For a simple example consider John Norton’s Dome as analyzed by Norton [32, 33] 
and Malament [27]. Imagine a ball resting on the top of a carefully designed Dome-
shaped surface. The ball can move frictionlessly, but it is restricted to move on the 
surface, and is only influenced by a homogeneous gravitational field. Our physical 
theory T is classical mechanics with Newton’s laws, in particular the second law: 
F = ma . In order to find how the ball moves we need to solve the initial value prob-
lem, where the force F of Newton’s law is determined by the shape of the Dome and 
by the gravitational field, and where the initial values are the initial position and 
momentum of the ball. If this were a commonplace problem in classical mechanics 
we would get a unique solution telling us how the ball moves. However the shape 
of the Dome is trickily designed so that our initial value problem yields many dif-
ferent solutions: the ball spontaneously starts to roll from the top of the Dome, but 
classical mechanics can’t tell us when this starting moment happens. In other words, 
the Dome shows that under the assumptions (1)–(4) property (5) fails in classical 
mechanics. Given definition (D) and formulation (A) the solutions of the Dome are 
not deterministic, and hence we get the somewhat counterintuitive conclusion that 
determinism fails in classical mechanics. Thus for the research project to succeed 
we ought to find, for each not deterministic solution of the Dome, a proposition that 
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provides a better balance of simplicity and informativeness about the solution than 
F = ma.
Substituting the force determined by the shape of the Dome and by the gravita-
tional field, Newton’s law in the Dome world becomes
where x is the distance of the ball from the top of the Dome on its surface and the (2) 
superscript denotes the second derivative with respect to the time parameter. (As the 
reader can readily check, the family of “Dome solutions”,
parametrized with the time 휏 when the ball spontaneously starts to roll from the top 
of the Dome, all solve equation 1 for the same initial values x(0) = 0 , x(1) = 0 . A 
particular choice of 휏 yields a particular Dome solution.)
Albeit equation (1) contains some “ugly” mathematical notation it may strike us 
as “simple”. Can we really hope to find a proposition which better balances simplic-
ity and informativeness for a particular not deterministic Dome solution than the 
equation (1) itself?
Well, simplicity is in the eye of the beholder. Contrast (1) with the following dif-
ferential equation:
where k is a yet undetermined number. A charitable reader is going to agree that, at 
least at a first blush, it is not unreasonable to hold that equation (2) is “simpler” than 
equation (1). There may be issues with the number k not being “simple” enough, but 
(2) is homogenous and only makes reference to differentiation, while (1) is inhomo-
geneous and involves, besides differentiation, the square root of the variable as well.
The solutions of equation (2) are polynomials up to the k-th degree. Polynomi-
als can be used to approximate finite trajectories and thus they can approximately 
describe the path the ball rolling down on the Dome takes in any particular Dome 
solution. Mathematically speaking for any finite stretch of a solution s of equation 
(1) we can find a value for k so that a solution s′ of equation (2) stays within our 
desired level of approximation to s. By appropriately choosing k number of initial 
values we can uniquely determine this s′ solution. Thus, assuming our Best System 
only systematizes a finite lifespan of the Dome universe, equation (2) may count as 
a proposition of a deductive system which approximates truth, is informative and is 
simple.
As equation (2) is merely approximately true while equation (1) is exactly true 
of a Dome solution, an account of laws that crowns (2) as a law for such a solu-
tion would need to allow approximate truth to be sufficient for lawhood. The Best 
Approximately True Systems is such an account. If we accept that equation (2) is 
simpler than equation (1), it becomes a question of balance whether (2) or (1) should 
count as a law in a Dome solution according to BATS. As the loss in truth due to the 
(1)x(2) =
√
x,
x(t) =
{
0 if 0 ≤ t ≤ 𝜏
1
144
t4 if 𝜏 < t,
(2)x(k) = 0,
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approximation could be made arbitrarily small, if a gain in simplicity and informa-
tiveness has an effect on the balance of informativeness, simplicity and approxima-
tion to truth, then the overall balance may be improved by a suitable choice of small 
approximation. In case it turns out that equation (2) provides a better balance than 
equation (1), we get the conclusion that in formulation (B) of physical possibility 
a not deterministic Dome solution is not physically possible according to classical 
mechanics, since its laws are not those of Newton’s. The laws of deterministic solu-
tions of F = ma would however be still those of Newton’s, since for deterministic 
solutions we would loose informativeness by moving to an approximation like (2). 
Thus deterministic solutions are physically possible according to classical mechan-
ics, while not deterministic solutions are not.
This conclusion does not depend on the assumption of having only one instance 
of the Dome-particle system being present in the world. Taking x to be a 3N-dimen-
sional vector equation (2) applies to a system of N point particles and hence it has 
solutions approximating any finite lifespans of worlds that contain, say, N number of 
Dome-particle systems, without losing any simplicity or informativeness. Neverthe-
less the argument has many shortcomings, notably the assumption that our Best Sys-
tem only systematizes a finite lifespan of the possible world. The gain in simplicity 
by equation (2) might turn out to be too small to favor one system over the other, and 
it may even be illusory. The distance measured between trajectories by the supre-
mum norm might not be physically relevant. A further nagging point is that equation 
(2) requires k number values to determine the solution instead of equation (1)’s 3 
(two plus the time when the ball starts to spontaneously roll), their only advantage 
being that all k of them are initial values. This brings up the question whether infor-
mativeness or simplicity of laws should depend upon their ability to get combined 
with additional accessible informative and simple propositions in order to produce 
further informative and simple propositions about the world (for an elaboration on 
this point, see [21]).
In general, instead of attempting to find some abstract scheme to approximate 
not deterministic solutions of arbitrary differential equations, it seems worthwhile 
to investigate the relationship of various concrete differential equations in physics. 
Among the partial differential equations the typical sources of failure of uniqueness 
are the so-called parabolic and elliptic equations, such as the classical heat equa-
tion or the Laplace equation. There is a general sense in which such equations can 
be approximated by quasilinear first order hyperbolic equations whose initial value 
problems have a unique solution. Robert Geroch, one of the main authorities on par-
tial differential equations in physics opines that
A case could be made that, at least on a fundamental level, all the “partial dif-
ferential equations of physics” are hyperbolic – that, e.g.  elliptic and parabolic 
systems arise in all cases as mere approximations of hyperbolic systems. Thus, 
Poisson’s equation for the electric potential is just a facet of a hyperbolic sys-
tem, Maxwell’s equations. ([19], pp. 2, 3)
Geroch then proceeds to show that a general symmetrization procedure is available 
for quasilinear first order hyperbolic systems; for symmetric systems general theo-
rems on existence and uniqueness of solutions are available.
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If conversely a not deterministic solution s of the parabolic or elliptic equation 
E of a physical theory T can be approximated by a deterministic solution s′ of a 
hyperbolic equation E′ of another physical theory T ′ then physics, beyond helping 
with the problem of rendering the theory T deterministic, may also help to allevi-
ate the philosophical problem of vagueness plaguing the key concepts—informa-
tiveness, simplicity, and approximation—of the Best Approximately True Systems 
account of laws. As E′ represents a law of another physical theory, it is likely going 
to pass both as simple and informative. Having unique initial value problems, E′ is 
also likely going to be more informative than E. Moreover, since the main motiva-
tion for upholding simplicity and informativeness as defining characteristics of laws 
is that these seem to be true of the fundamental equations that appear in our physi-
cal theories, we may even bypass the problem of having to define what we mean by 
informativeness and simplicity altogether. The sense in which s and s′ approximate 
each other is made explicit by the mathematical claim of the approximative relation-
ship itself, and this sense of approximation can also provide the relevant notion of 
approximation to truth required by the Best Approximately True Systems account of 
laws.
This analysis is cursory, but it adds yet an additional reason for why thorough 
investigation of the approximative relationships of different physical theories should 
further be pursued. The prospects of our research project to save determinism could 
only be adequately judged after such detailed investigation is brought to fruition.
5  Concluding Remarks
This paper raises awareness that determinism of theories crucially depends on our 
understanding of physical possibility and of laws of nature, and argues that a com-
bination of extant philosophical accounts of physical possibility and laws of nature 
could imply that certain physical theories (which are widely regarded as not deter-
ministic in the philosophical literature) are deterministic after all. Although our 
focus on determinism of theories is in line with the general discussion of determin-
ism in the foundations of physics literature, one could argue that our primer philo-
sophical interest lies in the truth of determinism of our actual world, and it is not a 
foregone conclusion that (failure of) determinism of current physical theories has 
any implication about (failure of) determinism of our actual world. First, although 
the theory-based formulations of physical possibility ((A) and (B)) are equivalent 
with their actual world-based counterparts ((a) and (b)) in case we consider the the-
ory T
a
 which comprises all and only those laws that are laws in the actual world, 
there are good reasons to believe that none of our current physical theories express 
the same laws as T
a
 ; worse, the actual world might not be, strictly speaking, physi-
cally possible according to any of our current physical theories. This limits the value 
of the insights we can gain about determinism of our actual world from studying the 
fate of determinism of our current physical theories. Second, we should especially 
be careful in drawing conclusions from failure of determinism of a theory to failure 
of determinism of the actual world. A theory fails to be deterministic if any of its 
physically possible worlds fails to be deterministic; failure of determinism of some 
 Foundations of Physics
1 3
physically possible worlds however does not entail that the actual world also fails to 
be deterministic. In principle a theory could fail to be deterministic and yet the same 
theory could be suggestive of the truth of determinism of the actual world. Hence 
even if we rejected the combination of the account of physical possibility and laws 
of nature that we argued could avert the failure of determinism of theories, it could 
still be the case that our actual world a is deterministic even if its complete and true 
T
a
 physical theory is not deterministic.
This being said failure of determinism of a theory may still be indicative of seri-
ous problems, especially when there is another theory describing the same phenom-
ena that is deterministic. Although there have been recent attempts to explore how 
failure of determinism of one theory may be cured by another (see [15]), the litera-
ture still assumes that determinism of a particular physical theory can be assessed 
by addressing that theory alone. If an investigation of inter-theoretical relationships 
would succeed along the lines proposed in the previous section then, with formula-
tion (B) of the received view of physical possibility and with a Best Approximately 
True Systems account of laws, determinism of a particular physical theory also 
becomes dependent upon its relationship to other physical theories. Thus a physical 
theory that is not deterministic with formulation (A) may turn out to be determinis-
tic according to formulation (B).
The subtle difference between the (A) and (B) formulation of the received view 
of physical possibility could lead to substantially different philosophical conclusions 
regarding the fate of determinism, and hence the question naturally arises which of 
these formulations should be adopted. We have not investigated this question here, 
and it is unclear whether we can enlist any independent reasons that could strongly 
compel us to favor one formulation of the received view over the other (for details 
see [21]). However, if determinism is indeed to be rather thought of as a heuristic, 
‘defeasible methodological imperative’ ([14], p. 1372), then the formulation of the 
received view of physical possibility and the account of laws of nature whose com-
bination succeeds in salvaging determinism does seem to have an advocate at the 
trial of grand metaphysical speculations.
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